The UN as the body responsible for maintaining international security has an important role tackling the nuclear issue with Iran. While media reporting often focuses on Iran’s negations with the P5+1 group of countries, it is the Security Council that has adopted universally-binding sanctions on Iran. The instigating factor behind the UN’s sanctions resolutions has been IAEA reports regarding Iran’s non-compliance. The cohesion of the Security Council in responding to Iran’s nuclear programme sends a clear signal to Iran that its actions are unacceptable not in keeping with international norms.
UN sanctions are, however, intended to do more than express dissatisfaction with Iran’s activities. UN sanctions are intended to constrain the development of Iran’s program by preventing the export to Iran of technologies that could benefit the country’s nuclear and missile programmes – technologies which are often dual-use (or civilian) in origin.
This year’s report highlights ongoing attempts by Iran to acquire technologies illicitly from the international marketplace. The report complements Alpha’s own portfolio of illicit procurement case studies by identifying several new cases, which can be accessed on this page. In particular, Alpha has prepared detailed analysis of one case involving the shipment of bellows-sealed valves from German and Indian companies to the Arak heavy water reactor in Iran, a reactor which has potential uses in plutonium production - see here.
The reported sanctions violations do, however, appear to be only a small proportion of the overall amount of illicit trade that sustains Iran’s programs. In the last year Iran has deployed the IR2m centrifuge which is based upon a Carbon Fibre rotor even though previous reporting shows clearly that Iran lacks the capability to produce carbon fibre of the grades required for use in centrifuges. While the panel’s most recent report does document one interdiction of carbon fibre, it is clear that other procurement has gone unimpeded.
Similarly, the report highlights that construction of Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor continues to move forward despite interdiction of critical parts sought from the international marketplace.
It is notable that while some of the illicit procurement attempts were for controlled goods other were for goods that do not feature on UN sanctions resolutions but that are nonetheless sensitive. Manufacturers of both controlled and otherwise sensitive goods must continue to exercise vigilance
Finally, the report includes important recommendations to the Security Council specifically and the international community more generally. These include increasing alertness to illicit procurement attempts, making available more information on attempts to circumvent sanctions, and making the language of sanctions more actionable. The report also recommends that additions be made to the sanctions lists in response to specific concerns. While not an explicit recommendation of the panel, the Security Council sanctions committee should also work to update its lists of controlled technology in light of the NSG’s fundamental review. If sanctions and the NSG control lists become out of step there is a real risk that known items of proliferation concern could be procured by Iran without explicitly breaching Iran’s obligations.
