Alpha is delighted to announce the arrival of four new experts.
Cathy Gilhespy and Nick Mitchell come to us having left distinguished roles in the UK Government's Export Control Organisation. To view their profiles, click here. Both Nick and Cathy will focus on improving export control implementation amongst manufacturers and exporters.
Geoffrey Smith and Glenn Anderson come to us from the Ministry of Defence. Geoff will focus on identifying and engaging manufacturers of technologies with nuclear end uses whereas Glenn will focus on the implementation of trade controls in the shipping and fast-freight forwarding industries.
These individuals will supplement the current team in working to improve the implementation of trade controls. In particular, all four are keen to meet with companies that have first hand experience in implementing trade controls or dealing with suspicious enquirers. Why not arrange a meeting to share your experiences?
The Alpha team frequently visits firms to discuss export compliance issues. The team includes former UK government officials with many years of experience working in this area. They are happy to discuss any difficulties which firms have in implementing export control regulations and to provide support and guidance. Email [email protected] to arrange a visit.
Firms should also consider sharing suspicious inquiries that they receive with the project team. Doing so can have significant benefits in helping firms across the board to prevent illicit trade.
The project team has experience dealing with this type of sensitive information and has strict research ethics and data protection protocols in place to ensure information is secure. Firms will be asked how their information may be used: in a named case study, such as the piece detailing Rakon UK’s work to prevent illicit trade, in an anonomised case study such as this, or just for background information.
Note: Project Alpha is governed by both data protection laws and research ethics considerations. Any information provided to the project will be treated as confidential unless otherwise agreed. Any information or guidance received from Alpha should not be viewed as legal advice: while every effort will be made to ensure information is correct at the time of its provision, it is for your company to ensure that you meet all legally-binding obligations when conducting business and / or trade.
In late June 2013, the UN panel of experts that was set up to monitor the implementation of sanctions on North Korea released its final report. The report outlines North Korea’s continued efforts to breach UN sanctions in order to supply its WMD programmes, import and export conventional arms, and import luxury goods. The report issued a number of recommendations to the UN Security Council and national authorities to enable more effective implementation of sanctions.
UN sanctions have been in place on North Korea since July 2006 following a series of missile tests on the 4th July. Since then, North Korea has undertaken three nuclear weapons tests, the latest in February this year, and a number of long-range missile tests. The sanctions have targeted North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and related illicit activities.
These UN sanctions have included measures taken to prevent the DPRK’s acquisition of sensitive goods and materials for its WMD programmes, an arms embargo, and prohibitions on the transfer of luxury goods. The relevant resolutions also include a number of measures that states and their private sectors should take to prevent activities, such as financing, that can assist North Korea’s prohibited programmes.
Most recently, following the latest nuclear weapons test in March 2013, the Security Council passed Resolution 2094 which added a number of sensitive items to the lists of those prohibited from import or export to North Korea and expanded other measures.
The 2013 panel report highlights developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes over the past year. It also covers the work of the panel over the past 12 months, including incidents of alleged sanctions non-compliance that it investigated.
The Panel’s investigations highlighted a number of incidents of alleged non-compliance in relation to the prohibitions on imports and exports of sensitive technologies to North Korea. These included:
The report also provides details on the attempts by North Korea and other entities to breach other measures put in place by the UN resolutions, such as the arms embargo in UNSCR 1874 (2006). Similarly, there are examples of interdictions of shipments of luxury goods, for which a ban was put in place by UNSCR 1718 in 2006. A major difficulty of this measure thus far has been the ambiguity and resulting differing interpretations of the term ‘luxury goods’. A baseline definition was provided in March 2013’s UNSCR 2094 focusing on jewellery and transportation items.[6]
The panel’s 2013 final report can be accessed here.
[1] United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.23.
[2] Ibid, p.25.
[3] Ibid, p.26.
[4] United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2012/422, 14 June 2012, p.19.
[5] United Nations, ‘Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009)’, S/2013/337, 11 June 2013, p.29.
[6] See Annex IV of United Nations, ‘Resolution 2094 (2013)’, 7 March 2013, http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2094%20%282013%29.
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The Alpha team is pleased to announce that as part of the Virtual Conference Series, David Lowrie will speak on his experiences combating suspicious inquiries from Iran while implementing compliance. David, compliance manager at Rakon UK, recently published a paper on this topic with Alpha's own Daniel Salisbury. Please register for this event here. Note: this event is free for Alpha members and for smaller firms as defined here.
]]>Bank Mellat is one of the largest banks, and the largest privately owned bank, in Iran. It has allegedly been involved in providing financial services that have enabled procurement in some areas of Iran’s nuclear programme. Sanctions were imposed on Bank Mellat by the US and the EU in 2007 and 2010.
More recently, Bank Mellat has been disputing the grounds on which these sanctions were imposed and seeking legal proceedings to bring about their removal. They have recently had some success on this front with a UK Supreme Court ruling that the UK sanctions were unlawful in June 2013, following a similar ruling by the EU General Court in January and lifting of the designation of the bank’s Chairman by the EU in 2012. However, EU sanctions remain in place whilst the EU appeals the ruling at the European Court of Justice. This case study explores the Bank Mellat case and some of the issues surrounding it.
Bank Mellat and Alleged Involvement in Proliferation
Bank Mellat was designated under E.O.13382 in 2007 ‘for providing financial services to AEOI and Novin Energy Company (AEOI financial conduit)’.[1] The UK Treasury has also listed Bank Mellat since 2009 under the The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order (2009).[2] This order has effectively excluded the bank from the UK financial market. The 2009 Order has since been superseded as a consequence of the EU’s listing of Bank Mellat in Regulation (EU) No 668/2010.[3]This regulation has, since 2010, effectively excluded Bank Mellat from the EU market as a whole, and has seen its EU assets frozen.
US State Department cables released by activist group Wikileaks provide some insights into the reasons for Bank Mellat’s listing by the US government. The following allegations, amongst others have been made regarding the Bank’s activities:
Bank Mellat has continually denied all allegations of involvement in proliferation-related trade.
Disputing Sanctions against Bank Mellat
Bank Mellat has been pushing at multiple levels to have sanctions against it lifted since 2009. In 2011, it lodged an appeal with the UK Court of Appeal to have the sanctions against it lifted on both substantive and procedural grounds.[6] The substantive grounds related to the proportionality of the measures imposed on Mellat; the Judge presiding concluded in this regard that the ‘rational connection’ between the bank and Iran’s nuclear activities was ‘permissible’, and that the intrusive measures taken against the bank were ‘justified by the very high value of the legitimate aim, namely minimising the risk of very great harm to vital national interests’.[7] The Judge also rejected allegations that the bank had been unable to make a representation, commenting that the bank’s representatives had made an ‘impressive albeit ultimately unsuccessful challenge’ to the 2009 order.[8]
In August 2012, it launched a successful appeal to have the name of its former Chairman, Dr Ali Divandari, removed from the EU sanctions. A regulation was published on 2 August 2012 legally removing sanctions from Divandari.[9]
In January 2013, the EU General Court ruled that the EU had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the Bank’s links to Iran’s nuclear efforts when it decided to list it in 2010.[10] This ruling meant that the EU had to cancel sanctions against the bank.
The EU decided, in April, to appeal the decision by the General Court. This appeal is pending at the highest court, the European Court of Justice. Whilst this appeal is pending, Bank Mellat remained on the EU sanctions list.[11]
The June 2013 UK Supreme Court Judgement
In June 2013, a ruling was made at the UK Supreme Court regarding UK financial sanctions on Bank Mellat. A judge ruled that the sanctions against the Bank were based on ‘misconceptions about the facts’ and ‘singled out Bank Mellat without rational grounds’.[12]
Rather than allowing Bank Mellat to reinstate its European operations which remain closed due to the EU measures still in place, the judgement is perhaps more representative of both a moral victory and a precedent.
Further Cases: A Precedent?
The victories for Bank Mellatat the courts, whilst not explicitly affecting the bank’s ability to conduct business operations in Europe yet, do set an interesting precedent. The cases raise significant questions regarding the standards of evidence required to impose proliferation-related sanctions and also the criteria which need to be met by this evidence for sanctions to be imposed.
A large number of entities that have been designated, listed, or sanctioned have decided to mount legal challenges. A news report from January 2013 indicates that 50 Iranian entities had cases outstanding at the European courts.[13] There is also, of course, the possibility that entities judged to have been sanctioned in error could claim compensation for lost business and reputational damages.
[1] ‘Fact Sheet: Overview of Iranian Linked Financial Institutions Designated by the United States’, Treasury Department Fact Sheet, 23 January 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/012312_Fact_Sheet_-_Designated_Iranian_Financial%20Institutions.pdf.
[2] ‘The Financial Restrictions (Iran) Order (2009)’, UK Statutory Law approved by the Houses of Parliament in October 2009, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2009/2725/pdfs/uksi_20092725_en.pdf.
[3] ‘Regulation (EU) No 668/2010’, available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0025:0036:EN:PDF.
[4] Following 7 points are taken from Secretary of State, ‘Request for Malaysia to withdraw Conditional Approval for Bank Mellat License’, US State Department Cable, Cable No.09STATE13998, 13 February 2009, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09STATE13998.html, accessed 20 June 2013.
[5] This and the next point taken from Secretary of State, ‘Information on Iran’s use of Bank Mellat Seoul For Proliferation Activities’, Cable No.08STATE30247, 24 March 2008, http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08STATE30247.html, accessed 20 June 2013.
[6] Court of Appeal Judgement, ‘Bank Mellat v HM Treasury’, 12 October 2012, available from http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/1.html, accessed 20 June 2013.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid.
[9] ‘Regulation (EU) No 668/2010’, available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:195:0025:0036:EN:PDF.
[10] ‘Iran Bank to Sue EU after winning Sanction List Case’, Reuters, 30 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/iran-bankmellat-eu-idUSL5N0AZEOB20130130.
[11] Clare Hutchinson, ‘British Supreme Court Ruling Threatens Western Sanctions Against Iran’, Reuters, 19 June 2013, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/06/19/uk-iran-sanctions-idUKBRE95I18A20130619.
[12] Kit Chellel, ‘Bank Mellat U.K. Sanctions over Nuclear Weapons Links Overturned’, Bloomberg, 19 June 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-19/bank-mellat-u-k-sanctions-on-nuclear-weapon-links-overturned.html.
[13] ‘Iran Bank to Sue EU after winning Sanction List Case’, Reuters, 30 January 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01/30/iran-bankmellat-eu-idUSL5N0AZEOB20130130.
On the 18th June 2013, U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon recommended changes to the sanctions that have been in place on Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. If accepted, Ban’s recommendation would see the ongoing humanitarian dispute between Kuwait and Iraq (relating to missing Kuwaiti nationals, and border, property and other issues) dealt with under Chapter 6, rather than Chapter 7, of the U.N. Charter, which allows the Security Council to impose measures for peace-keeping, ranging from sanctions to military intervention. The change, if it is passed, will go a long way to restoring Iraq’s image and will enable it to move closer to a sanctions-free status.
U.N. Charter: Chapters 6 and 7
In 1990, shortly after Saddam Hussein’s forces entered Kuwait on the 2nd August, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 condemning the attack and calling for the immediate recall of Iraqi troops. Shortly afterwards, on the 4th August 1990, the Security Council approved Resolution 661, the first of a wave of Resolution, which imposed wide-ranging sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi-controlled Kuwait, including: punitive economic sanctions, largely targeted at the finance and oil and gas sectors; an arms embargo; and other trade restrictions. All of these Resolutions were passed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which authorises action for peacekeeping and against acts of aggression. After the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003, a further Resolution, 1483, was adopted, against under Chapter 7, reducing most of the trade restrictions, but freezing assets and designating entities related to Saddam Hussein and his former government, such as The Central Bank of Iraq and TDG Ltd. (a UK registered company). The arms embargo, Iraqi obligations to restore Kuwaiti citizens and property, and disarmament obligations were maintained.
Ban Ki-moon’s Recommendation
Many of the outstanding issues with regards to UN sanctions on Iraq relate to missing Kuwaiti people and property, whilst many others have been resolved. The oil and gas sanctions were officially lifted in 2010 when the administration of the country’s oil resources was returned to the Iraqi government. Ban Ki-moon’s recommendation is to address the outstanding humanitarian issue of missing Kuwaiti persons and property. This issue would cease to be implemented under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter (Nb. ‘Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression’) and instead the UN would use Chapter 6 of the Charter, which regulates the ‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’. Thus, the only Chapter 7 issue outstanding would then be the compensation package of $11 billion owed to Kuwait by Iraq.
What this means for UK Trade
It is a common misconception that UK businesses should not be exporting to, or investing in, Iraq. Restrictions on arms still exist, as do restrictions on designated entities, under UN, EU and US sanctions. At the same time, there are numerous opportunities in the country and UKTI focusses in particular on, amongst others: the oil and gas; telecommunications and security sectors.[1] UK businesses should consult the UKTI website and relevant designated entity lists for further information.
[1] Cf. The Iran Business Guide from UK Trade and Investment, available for download at: http://www.ukti.gov.uk/export/countries/asiapacific/middleeast/iraq/doingbusiness.html, accessed 20th June 2013.
The panel of experts set up to monitor the implementation of UN sanctions on Iran has released its annual report. The report highlights Iran’s continued non-compliance with its international obligations and its continued defiance of UN Security Council orders to suspend the country’s controversial nuclear and missile programme and to halt procurement of sensitive technologies that could support these programmes.
The UN as the body responsible for maintaining international security has an important role tackling the nuclear issue with Iran. While media reporting often focuses on Iran’s negations with the P5+1 group of countries, it is the Security Council that has adopted universally-binding sanctions on Iran. The instigating factor behind the UN’s sanctions resolutions has been IAEA reports regarding Iran’s non-compliance. The cohesion of the Security Council in responding to Iran’s nuclear programme sends a clear signal to Iran that its actions are unacceptable not in keeping with international norms.
UN sanctions are, however, intended to do more than express dissatisfaction with Iran’s activities. UN sanctions are intended to constrain the development of Iran’s program by preventing the export to Iran of technologies that could benefit the country’s nuclear and missile programmes – technologies which are often dual-use (or civilian) in origin.
This year’s report highlights ongoing attempts by Iran to acquire technologies illicitly from the international marketplace. The report complements Alpha’s own portfolio of illicit procurement case studies by identifying several new cases, which can be accessed on this page. In particular, Alpha has prepared detailed analysis of one case involving the shipment of bellows-sealed valves from German and Indian companies to the Arak heavy water reactor in Iran, a reactor which has potential uses in plutonium production - see here.
The reported sanctions violations do, however, appear to be only a small proportion of the overall amount of illicit trade that sustains Iran’s programs. In the last year Iran has deployed the IR2m centrifuge which is based upon a Carbon Fibre rotor even though previous reporting shows clearly that Iran lacks the capability to produce carbon fibre of the grades required for use in centrifuges. While the panel’s most recent report does document one interdiction of carbon fibre, it is clear that other procurement has gone unimpeded.
Similarly, the report highlights that construction of Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor continues to move forward despite interdiction of critical parts sought from the international marketplace.
It is notable that while some of the illicit procurement attempts were for controlled goods other were for goods that do not feature on UN sanctions resolutions but that are nonetheless sensitive. Manufacturers of both controlled and otherwise sensitive goods must continue to exercise vigilance
Finally, the report includes important recommendations to the Security Council specifically and the international community more generally. These include increasing alertness to illicit procurement attempts, making available more information on attempts to circumvent sanctions, and making the language of sanctions more actionable. The report also recommends that additions be made to the sanctions lists in response to specific concerns. While not an explicit recommendation of the panel, the Security Council sanctions committee should also work to update its lists of controlled technology in light of the NSG’s fundamental review. If sanctions and the NSG control lists become out of step there is a real risk that known items of proliferation concern could be procured by Iran without explicitly breaching Iran’s obligations.
Background
While Iran’s centrifuge enrichment programme is often the element of Iran’s nuclear work which generates the most attention in the press, there are also concerns surrounding the country’s work on a heavy water reactor at Arak. This research reactor is intended to produce radioactive isotopes for medical uses. However, once complete it could also be used by Iran to produce plutonium, which when reprocessed from the spent fuel could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Modern Industries Technique Company (MITEC) is an entity that was listed by the UN Security Council in UNSCR1929, with the resolution detailing that the entity is ‘responsible for design and construction of the IR-40 heavy water reactor in Arak’ and has ‘spearheaded procurement for the construction’.[1] A US Treasury document indicates that MITEC is ‘owned or controlled’ by the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), and has been involved in the Arak project since 2001.[2]
MITEC’s Procurement Activities
MITEC is alleged to have attempted to procure 1,767 valves for the heavy water research reactor under construction at Arak between 2007 and 2011.[3] 1,163 valves are alleged to have reached MITEC during the period. This number of valves is believed to be sufficient to equip the entire Arak facility in orders worth $7.7 million.[4]
MITEC is alleged to have contacted Hossein Tanideh, alleged to be an owner of a number of companies in Germany, to request the procurement of valves of three types.[5] T in turn contacted Rudolf M, a Weimar-based company owner, and successful negotiation led to a first shipment of valves being made in October 2010 via Turkey to Iran. Two other individuals, Gholamali and Kianzad K., are also alleged to have been involved in setting up following deals. The two Ks, Rudolf M and another individual, Hamid Kh, were arrested by German police in August 2012.[6] Tanideh was arrested in Turkey in June 2012.[7]
The table below provides a summary of the alleged shipments of valves derived from open sources (an incomplete account is currently available in open sources):
|
Valve shipments made to MITEC and Arak[8] |
|||||
|
Date |
Supplier |
Product |
Alleged End User |
Actual End User |
Comments |
|
October 2010 |
Rudolf M. Weimar-based company |
Valves (unstated quantity[9]) |
Fictional end user later provided in Azerbaijan |
Iran |
Shipments made via Turkey; believed to have reached Iran. |
|
Prior to or during Spring 2011 |
Entrepreneur based in Halle, Germany |
655 standard industrial valves (€1 mil value, unlisted) |
Turkish firm? |
Shipments made via Turkey; 51 valves alleged to have reached Iran. |
|
|
Valves forged in India, transferred to Turkey |
856 valves specifically designed for nuclear end use. |
Turkish firm? |
Allegedly sent on 4 occasions; believed to have reached Iran. |
||
2013 UN Panel Report
The June 2013 UN Panel of Experts on Iran sanctions Final Report provides some more details regarding the case. This includes the technical specifications of the valves, the methods used to procure the goods and entities involved.
Technology
In terms of the valves procured, the Panel report notes that ‘One group of 856 valves had a number of features consistent with use in the context of a heavy water reactor. These included the material specified for valve body construction, welded, bellows-sealed valves, the valve stem packing material, valve actuators specified according to standard IEEE 382 (for nuclear power generating stations), and actuators with an IP rating of 67’.[10] IEEE 382 standard is particularly notable given that products meeting this specification are able to operate in a radiation environment.[11]
Methods
The report notes that ‘this procurement involved the use of front companies in other third countries and false end user documentation’.[12] Press reports highlight the use of front companies based in Turkey, and particularly one company, IDI which was owned by Tanideh. Reports from earlier this year indicate that Tanideh was arrested in Turkey and three other linked individuals were being sought by Turkish authorities.[13]
Entities
The report also notes the involvement of the entity ‘Pentane Chemistry’.[14] The technical details above were derived from correspondence between MITEC and Pentane. It is not the first time that Pentane has been involved in illicit procurement activities. Pentane Chemistry Industries was linked to an Iranian individual listed as the consignee on a shipment of phosphor bronze wire mesh which was intercepted at Seoul International Airport during transhipment between Tianjin, China and Turkey. The Panel investigated the interdiction and included findings in its 2011 report that this constituted a breach of sanctions.[15]
The 2013 Panel report includes a recommendation that Pentane should be designated following ‘documentary and factual evidence’ of violation of paragraph 12 of resolution 1929.[16]
[1] United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1929, 2010, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf.
[2] ‘Fact Sheet: E.O. Designations on Iran’, 21 November 1022, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/11212011_iran_wmd_factsheet.pdf.
[3] UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1929, Final Report 2013, p.7.
[4] Cathrin Gilbert, Holger Stark & Andreas Ulrich, ‘Nuclear Technology for Iran: German Investigators Uncover Illegal Exports’, Der Spiegel, 1 October 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/nuclear-technology-for-iran-german-investigators-uncover-illegal-exports-a-858893.html.
[5] Ibid; while German privacy laws prohibit the release of his full name by the German press, it has been released by the Turkish press.
[6] ‘Germany Accuses four of Breaching Iran Nuclear Embargo’, BBC News, 15 August 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-19267157.
[7] ‘Covert Iranian nuclear dealings via Turkey revealed’, Today’s Zamen, 12 March 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-309539-covert-iranian-nuclear-dealings-via-turkey-revealed.html.
[8] Derived from Cathrin Gilbert, Holger Stark & Andreas Ulrich, ‘Nuclear Technology for Iran: German Investigators Uncover Illegal Exports’ and ‘Covert Iranian nuclear dealings via Turkey revealed’, Today’s Zamen...
[9] If 1,767 figure from 2013 UN Panel report is correct, likely number is 256 valves.
[10] Panel Report 2013, p.7.
[11] See the IEEE 382 standard at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=531658.
[12] Ibid
[13] Covert Iranian nuclear dealings via Turkey revealed’, Today’s Zamen
[14] Ibid
[15] UN Panel of Experts established pursuant to UNSCR 1929, Final Report 2011, p.15.
[16] Panel Report 2013, p.3.
The illicit trade in sensitive products and materials is a major problem for international security today. Proliferators work within legitimate trade structures by exploiting weak points in supply chains. They will often employ approaches simultaneously, attempting to disguise their own intentions and actions through a variety of methods. This document will explore some of the ‘red flags’ that appear during transactions that can help exporters to identify illicit behaviour. In doing so, it will consider a number of examples derived from open sources and the work of Project Alpha to better illustrate some of these ‘red flags’ that exporters need to be aware of when dealing with dual-use and nuclear-related materials and products.
If you receive an enquiry you consider suspicious you can often allay concerns through your own research. However, you could also either apply for an export licence or utilise the UK Export Control Organisation's "End User Advisory Service".
On the 5th June 2013, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the expert panel established to monitor the implementation of Security Council sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, following its failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its nuclear programme. Dr. Jonathan Brewer, a visiting professor of the Centre for Science and Security Studies in King’s College London, has been a member of the panel since 2010. The new resolution extends the committee’s mandate for one year, through 9 July 2014. A description of the panel’s work can be accessed on this page.
While Iran insists its nuclear program is peaceful in nature, following the discovery in 2003 that Iran had been concealing aspects of its nuclear programme which should have been declared to the IAEA, and subsequent information of involvement in nuclear activities which appeared to have a military dimension, a number of countries have suspected Iran of harbouring intentions to develop nuclear weapons. The Security Council has enforced sanctions on Iran since 2006, including a ban on items which could contribute to its prohibited nuclear programmes and ballistic missile programmes, on arms sales to and from Iran, and a freeze of assets of designated individuals and entities.
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